The Power Behind International Law

Peter Li

Do global legal norms represent universal justice, or just the will of the powerful?

When the United Nations was founded in 1945, its charter proclaimed a commitment to universal human dignity and the sovereign equality of all nations. Yet a closer examination of international legal structures reveals an uncomfortable truth: the five permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom) possess veto power that no other nation enjoys. This architectural choice raises a fundamental question that has troubled legal scholars and diplomats for generations: Does international law embody universal principles of justice, or does it simply formalize the preferences of those powerful enough to write the rules?

The answer, unsettlingly, appears to be both. And the tension between these realities shapes every major conflict, treaty negotiation, and human rights debate on the global stage.

The Idealist Vision 

Proponents of international law as a universal enterprise point to genuine achievements. The Geneva Conventions established protections for civilians and prisoners of war that transcend national boundaries. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, articulated principles (freedom from torture, the right to education, protection from arbitrary detention) that resonated across cultural divides. The International Criminal Court prosecutes genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity based on standards that claim to apply equally to all people. These frameworks suggest something deeper than mere power politics. They reflect recurring moral intuitions that appear across civilizations: that aggression requires justification, that civilians deserve protection in warfare, that certain acts are so heinous they offend human conscience itself.

Natural law theorists argue these principles aren't invented by the powerful but discovered through reason and shared human experience. Moreover, international law sometimes constrains even the mighty. The United States faced significant diplomatic costs for its 2003 invasion of Iraq without clear Security Council authorization. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 brought economic sanctions precisely because it violated established norms against territorial conquest. These examples suggest international legal norms possess independent force beyond the immediate interests of powerful states.

The Realist Critique 

Yet the realist counterargument proves equally compelling. The very origins of modern international law reveal the fingerprints of European colonial powers. The concept of sovereignty itself emerged from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, codifying principles that served the interests of European monarchs.

When those same powers assembled in Berlin in 1884 to carve up Africa, they created "international law" governing colonial claims. This law served European interests while denying African peoples any voice whatsoever. This pattern persists today in subtler forms. Consider which nations possess nuclear weapons with international acceptance versus which face severe sanctions for pursuing them. Consider how the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (institutions that shape economic policy for developing nations) weight voting power according to financial contributions, effectively giving wealthy nations control over global economic governance. Consider that the United States has never ratified the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court, yet actively supported tribunals prosecuting African and Balkan leaders. 

Legal scholar Antony Anghie has documented how international law has historically served to legitimize rather than constrain imperial power. In his book Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Anghie argues that international law has always been animated by the "civilizing mission": the project of governing non European peoples. The economic exploitation and cultural subordination that resulted were, he contends, constitutively significant for the discipline.When powerful nations invoke "humanitarian intervention" or "responsibility to protect," they claim universal moral authority for actions that coincidentally serve their strategic interests. When weaker nations make similar claims, they lack both the military capacity and legal credibility to act. 

Even the Security Council's structure embeds power politics into law's foundation. Why should Britain and France (mid-sized powers with declining global influence) retain permanent veto authority while India, Brazil, and Nigeria, representing billions of people, have none? The answer lies not in principle but in the contingent fact that the victors of World War II designed the system.

The Productive Tension 

Perhaps the most sophisticated view recognises that international law exists in productive tension between universal aspiration and power realities. Law serves simultaneously as a language of justification that constrains action and as a tool of power that legitimises interests. This dual nature explains why even authoritarian regimes and aggressive powers feel compelled to justify their actions in legal terms rather than simply claiming the right of the strong. Russia framed its Ukraine intervention using legal language about protecting ethnic minorities and responding to security threats. China defends its South China Sea claims through historical legal arguments about traditional fishing rights and continental shelf boundaries. The very need to cloak power in legal justification suggests that law possesses normative force beyond raw strength.

At the same time, the international legal order clearly reflects the preferences of powerful states in its fundamental architecture. The challenge lies not in choosing between universal principles and power politics, but in understanding how they interact. International law provides a forum where weaker states can sometimes leverage norms against stronger ones, where moral arguments gain traction beyond military capacity, but where ultimately, enforcement depends on political will shaped by power distributions.

Moving Forward 

The question of whether international law represents universal principles or merely codified power proves less important than recognising how it functions as both. This recognition suggests several implications for how we engage with international legal institutions. First, we should maintain healthy scepticism toward claims that particular legal arrangements represent timeless universal principles. When powerful nations invoke international law to justify interventions, sanctions, or institutional arrangements, we should examine whose interests these legal interpretations serve. 

Second, we should recognise that international law, despite its limitations, provides crucial tools for resistance and accountability. Human rights organisations use international legal frameworks to document abuses and pressure governments. Smaller nations leverage legal norms in diplomatic negotiations. Indigenous peoples invoke international conventions to protect land rights. These uses of law matter, even when enforcement remains imperfect. 

Third, we should push for genuine reform that makes international institutions more representative. This means questioning permanent Security Council vetoes, reforming voting structures in international financial institutions, and centring voices from the Global South in treaty negotiations. Law that better reflects global diversity stands a better chance of embodying genuinely universal principles rather than narrow interests. Finally, we should cultivate what legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron describes as engagement with cosmopolitan norms: an approach that takes international law seriously as a moral project while remaining alert to how power shapes its development. Waldron argues that cosmopolitan norms have penetrated daily life as "a dense thicket of rules that sustain our life together, a life shared by people and peoples, not just in any particular society but generally on the face of the Earth." This means holding international law to its own highest aspirations while working to reshape legal structures toward greater justice.

Conclusion 

International law embodies humanity's noblest aspiration: that relations among nations might be governed by principle rather than force alone. Yet this aspiration exists in constant tension with the reality that powerful states shape legal frameworks to serve their interests. Rather than resolving this tension in favor of either idealism or cynicism, we should recognize both dynamics at work. 

The rules that govern our world were written largely by those with the power to write them. But the language of universal principle, once articulated, can be turned against its authors. The challenge lies in leveraging international law's moral claims while transforming its structures to better represent humanity's full diversity. Only then might international legal preferences truly reflect universal principles, not because the powerful declared them so, but because all voices helped shape them.